DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 324 735 CS 507 314

AUTHOR Brenders, David A.
TITLE Some Perplexities of Relational Power.
PUB DATE Apr 88
NOTE 20p.; Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Southern Speech Communication Association (Memphis, TN, April 8-10, 1988).
PUB TYPE Speeches/Conference Papers (150) -- Information Analyses (070)

EDRS PRICE MF01/PC01 Plus Postage.
DESCRIPTORS Communication Research; Higher Education; *Interpersonal Communication; *Interpersonal Relationship; Persuasive Discourse; *Power Structure
IDENTIFIERS Communication Strategies; Interpersonal Influence Process; *Power Strategies

ABSTRACT

This paper advances a relational approach to interpersonal power or social control. Drawing from the work of the Palo Alto group and further elaborations on this work made by S. R. Strong and C. D. Claiborn (1982), the paper outlines the coactive features of interpersonal control and stresses the relevance of these insights for the teaching of interpersonal persuasion. From the usual one-way view of power and influence, the analysis reveals some of the more counterintuitive or perplexing aspects of interpersonal control. The paper also highlights how mistaken notions of interpersonal control can lead to negative consequences. Specifically, it discusses how the assumption that power and control can be unilaterally exercised leads to a particular class of interpersonal pitfalls, and how the myth of unilateral control creates misguided or paradoxical forms of relationships. The paper identifies and discusses some of these misguided control strategies. (Twenty-eight references are attached.) (Author/SR)

**********
* Reproductions supplied by EDRS are the best that can be made *
* from the original document. *
**********

ED324735

# Some Perplexities of Relational Power

David A. Brenders
Department of Speech Communication
Indiana University
809 E. 7th Street
Bloomington, Indiana 47405

CS507314

A paper presented at the Southern Speech Communication Association Convention, Memphis, Tennessee, April, 1988.

"PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE THIS MATERIAL HAS BEEN GRANTED BY

David Brenders

TO THE EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)."

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
Office of Educational Research and Improvement
EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)

☐ This document has been reproduced as received from the person or organization originating it.

☐ Minor changes have been made to improve reproduction quality.

• Points of view or opinions stated in this document do not necessarily represent official OERI position or policy.

Some Perplexities Relational Power


## Abstract

This paper advances a relational approach to interpersonal power or social control. Drawing from the work of the Palo Alto group and further elaborations of this work made by Strong & Claiborn (1982), the coactive features of interpersonal control are outlined and the relevance of these insights for the teaching of interpersonal persuasion is stressed. From our usual one-way view of power and influence, this analysis reveals some of the more counterintuitive or perplexing aspects of interpersonal control. This analysis also highlights how mistaken notions of interpersonal control can lead to negative consequences. Specifically, the assumption that power and control can be unilaterally exercised leads to a particular class of interpersonal pitfalls. The myth of unilateral control creates misguided or paradoxical forms of relationships. This paper identifies and discusses some of these misguided control strategies.

Interpersonal influence and social power are becoming increasingly popular topics in the research literature of speech communication. As undergraduate courses move from the outmoded "human potential" approach toward a more pragmatic, skills-oriented approach to the teaching of interpersonal communication, the topic of interpersonal control through communicative and noncommunicative means will grow in interest. This topic is already well established in communication education, as the research on power in the classroom attests (see Kearney, 1987; McCrosky and Richmond,1983; Plax, Kearney, & Tucker,1986).

However, this work is unsatisfying for the teacher of interpersonal communication for a number of reasons. One drawback of much of this literature is its focuses on the decisions of the persuader without regard to the effectiveness of these decisions (see Seibold, Cantrill, & Meyers, 1986). More importantly, much of this work assumes a one-way or call-and-response "tag team" flow of influence that, "obscures and oversimplifies the interactional, adaptive, and partially nonreflective character of communicative influence strategies" (Seibold, et al., 1986, p. 557).

Despite our intellectual understanding that "communication is a process" or that communicative events are complex and multicausal, we as a discipline are only beginning to elaborate the relational context of influence tactics in a way that provides a coherent perspective for students who wish to put the power of this perspective to work for them. In our present situation, interpersonal influence and interpersonal power is usually understood as merely the creation or effective utilization of messages selectively highlighting a person's ability to reward, punish, coerce or altercast. While this state of affairs may gain validity the more both teacher and student agree that it is so (see

Frank, 1974), the notion that power resides and flows unilaterally is not only misplaced, but leads to its own class of pedagogical pratfalls. In this vein, the observation by Bateson (1979) that it is not power that corrupts but the myth of power is appropriate. Given that this one-way examination of influence mirrors a widely held naive view of influence, this approach may not only be theoretically confining but responsible for fostering certain dysfunctional influence strategies.

A relational or interactional approach to interpersonal power and influence will allow the teacher of interpersonal communication to move from the pursuit of identifying and isolating the "magic bullets" of interpersonal persuasion (see Norton, 1984) or cataloguing the desirability of various "compliance gaining" tactics with regard to various canned scenarios, to the richer interpersonal context of influence with all of its ongoing and perplexing aspects. That is, a perspective on interpersonal influence should be as comfortable with explaining "faith healing," the "pigeon drop," the "low ball," and the "Bellac ploy" as it is with the two dimensional scenarios used by most text authors.

For example, consider the "compliance-gaining strategy" of one of the unsung figures of motivational psychology, "Titanic" Thompson. Taking naturally to the concepts of coactive control and strategic self-presentation discussed later, Thompson was able to gain the compliance of many eager associates with highly remunerative results. As Jay Robert Nash (1976) describes "Titanic's" approach:

> Titanic was particularly adept at mulcting marks on the golf links. He was a superb player who convincingly feigned clumsiness on the course, betting heavily with unsuspecting golfers and losing. He would then mumble

> something about "getting even," double his bet, and then turn on the talent and win. Seeing his partner a bit vexed at losing, perhaps upward of $1,000, the con man would appear conciliatory, casually stating: "Look, I'm a fair man. I'll play you another round left handed, double or nothing." The sucker, by this time, was certainly convinced that Thompson was impetuous, and maybe a little crazy. During the play of their first round, Titanic had made such zany bets as that he could knock a sparrow from a telegraph line with a golf ball or get his ball onto a green after thoroughly burying it in a sand trap. And after the victim had lost a round for a sizable amount of cash he was more than willing to take up Thompson's offer of left-handed play. Leaping at the bait, the mark and Thompson would begin all over again and Thompson would win handsomely, being a natural southpaw (p. 127).

Or consider the young man watching a game of three card monte in progress on a street in New York. The banter and commotion between the dealer and heavy betting players has attracted the man to watching the game, and he now stands at the side of the playing surface, facing the dealer's right. As the dealer banters with his active players and tosses the cards, it appears to this new onlooker that the dealer has fumbled the card nearest to him slightly, exposing it for an instant as the queen. The other players, facing the dealer head-on, could not profit from this momentary "error" and do not seem confident to pick out the queen. When no one seems able to answer the dealer's challenge, the young man steps forward, ready to profit from his keen observation.

This paper will argue that these above examples, as well as more mundane scenarios like it, are best explained from a relational view of compliance that highlights the coactive and emergent relationship between participants. Within this pragmatic view of compliance behavior, the systems/cybernetic principles of Bateson (1972, 1979) and the communicative axioms developed by Watzlawick,

et al. (1967) apply. These concepts have been further elaborated in a provocative theory of therapeutic influence and behavior change by Strong and Claiborn (1982), and their approach will provide the framework for our discussion of interpersonal control and influence. We will also briefly pursue the notion that misguided attempts at influence may sometimes not merely fail but set up patterns of resistance or unhappy relational patterns. These conspicuous failures will be seen to involve misguided or tacitly paradoxical notions of power and control (see Watzlawick, Weakland and Fisch, 1974).

## Coactive Control

The principle of coactive control asserts that each party in a relationship simultaneously controls and is influenced by the other (see Strong & Claiborn, 1982). Alternately, we may say that every behavior in a relationship is simultaneously the effect of the previous behavior and the cause of subsequent behavior (see Fisher & Hawes, 1971). This humble principle underlies the systems view of human relationships and is a key assumption of the pragmatic orientation to communication problems. The fact that it is so often ignored in favor of the common sense unilateral view of cause and effect speaks to the resilience of the mechanical view of human causation, a state of affairs that allows deficient notions of interpersonal control to become reified.

A key assumption here is that persons strive to control their environment in order to provide for their needs and resources. Since humans are social creatures, the "environment" they are mastering is an environment of other people, and the needs they have may be called "bio-social" since the process of their fulfillment requires the control of socially mediated channels (see Renshon, 1979). Since the people with whom one is interacting are also striving to fulfill their needs, they are potentially vulnerable to the resources and assets we may provide, just as we are seeking to control their

behavior in order to advance our own causes.

According to Strong and Claiborn (1982), control in the interpersonal sense is not direct and inevitable, but comes about from the person's needs andhis/her attempts to control the environment to satisfy those needs. As they explain this notion:

> Living creatures cannot be forced to do anything because they are self-determining. But they can be enticed into almost anything because they are vulnerable to their own needs and seek to control their environment for their benefit. Controlling another's actions is a matter of creating opportunities for the other that are too good to ignore, or making alternatives too bad to choose (p. 32)

Reciprocal patterns of control, based on each person's needs and his/her perceptions of his/her assets and the vulnerabilities of the other, form the interactive patterns of ongoing relationships. These relationships take on properties of their own, and control efforts may be directed at the progress of the relationship itself.

The coactive nature of interpersonal control entails that cause and effect are something we bring to communicative phenomenon rather than something to be discovered in the interaction. However, attributions of control take on a validity that is a function of our belief in them (see Bateson, 1968). In structuring our social world, we imbue it with cause-effect patterns that Watzlawick, et al. (1967) call the punctuation of the event sequence. Applied to the situation of interpersonal control, this assumption implies that although we may be in agreement with another on our explanation of "who controls what" this is mere agreement. Agreement offers no guarantee that we have found the real explanation of the phenomenon, only one that is <u>congruent</u> with both parties' perspectives.

Of course, our explanation or understanding of the situation may favor the control of one person over another (and therefore praise, blame, etc.) but this

does not mean that one has identified the "real" cause of the outcome since in opposite explanation has just as much support given the observed "facts" of interaction. People often fail to see the reciprocal coactive nature of interpersonal control because they confuse the idea of control with dominance and being controlled with submissiveness (Millar and Rogers, 1976; Watzlawick, Beavin and Jackson, 1967). If we consider behavioral control as the ability to shape future behaviors, one person's submissiveness is just as likely to elicit the other's dominance as the person's dominance is likely to reinforce submissive behaviors. As Bateson (1968) puts it:

> The paradigm for the statement "A instrumentally dominates B" will be: a' b a" where a' is A's command, telling B what to do, and possibly defining the conditional reinforcement: b is B's obedient act; and a" is A's administration of the reinforcement. Now the paradigm for A's dominance obviously resembles the paradigm given above for A's dependence, both having the form a' b a". The question therefore arises whether "instrumental dominance" is really different from "dependence;" or whether the participants in a given interaction have a freedom of interpretation such that a' b a" might appear to some individuals as dominance while to others it would appear as dependence. The answer is that there are certainly many instances in which a' can be regarded either as a plea for help or as a command; similarly b can often be regarded either as a helping act or as an act of obedience; and a", if it is a statement of acceptance, a "thank you," can be seen either as a condescending reward or as the appropriate response of the dependent. It is up to A and B each to weigh his own interpretation of the events, to determine whether A was dominant or dependent. Finally, it is important to note that A and B need not be in agreement in their perceptions at this level (p. 219-220).

Interactional behaviors will also be seen differently by the same people given a change in context and differently by different people given differences

in their social and personal relationship. Context often determines the perceived difference between strength and weakness, playfulness and hostility, humor and insult, insight and blasphemy (Watzlawick, Beavin & Jackson, 1967). Relationships have a social and personal aspect. Social constraints and role requirements (teacher versus student, associate versus hireling) will influence the perceived appropriateness of behavior. The interactional meaning of personal behaviors is negotiated through interaction, and the accumulation of these primarily tacit behavioral definitions, implications and constraints combines to form each party's definition of their relationship with the other (see Haley, 1963).

## Three Laws of Interaction

Based on the above notions, Strong and Claiborn (1982) derive three "laws of interaction" that govern the stability and change of reciprocal control through interpersonal interaction. These laws highlight how reciprocal control patterns lead to stable relationships, how unilateral attempts to change or influence the course of the relationships may be nullified or resisted, why certain bids for another's compliance provoke resistance, and why a reversal of our normal view of interpersonal control may bring about change.

The first law of interaction states that "Past interaction patterns are replicated in present and future interactions" (p. 37). That is, we tend to repeat familiar patterns of interaction and shape our current relationships according to the expectations we have formed from past relationships. This law relies on three interrelated facets of human nature, 1) people like to bring about social situations that are familiar and predictable, 2) our expectations may inhibit us from seeing the unique aspects of new situations, and 3) our habitual style of interaction (especially if successful) may prevent us from discovering that other ways of behaving may also produce desired outcomes (see also Leary, 1957; Watzlawick, 1984).

This law implies that our histories can supply us with situations that we are unwittingly doomed to repeat. Since the knowledge we have gained about the world by our pervious successes and failures and our interpretations of them constitute our "reality," we are likely to behave in ways that conform to these understandings and confirm these premises in the future.

The second law of interaction applies to relationships that have at least some minimal history. It states that "attempts to change a relationship will stimulate efforts to reestablish it" (Strong & Claiborn, 1982, p. 38). On an elementary level, when one party is unhappy with the relationship, he/she will seek to change it while his/her satisfied partner will exert pressure to keep it the same. While the success of any relational change will in part depend on the perceived assets/vulnerabilities of each party, attempts by one party to change the relationship and attempts by the other party to thwart change may negatively affect their perceptions of the other and the relationship. Even in cases where both parties wish to change, there is a danger that one or both parties may attempt relational solutions that perpetuate rather than solve the problem.

For example, a father and his delinquent son may both dislike the current state of their relationship and wish to change. However, the father may see the problem as a breakdown of discipline while the son regards his delinquent behavior as his only way to break out of an uncaring dictatorial environment. With this sort of discrepant set of interpretations/motivations implicitly established, any attempt to change the relationship in this manner will result in an intensification of the initial problem. That is, the father may "clamp down" on the son to discourage delinquency. However, this encourages the son to maintain or increase the delinquency in order to reassert his own control in the relationship. Caught in this dilemma, both father and son may unwittingly perpetuate the problem through their attempts to solve it (see Watzlawick,

Weakland, & Fisch, 1974). Through every move and countermove, the situation, though constantly changing, remains the same. In other words, the unilateral bid for change sets up or creates the resistance that nullifies it. We may speculate that this dilemma is at least in part due to the father's (or son's) belief that unilateral one-way influence through threats or bids for control is possible in interpersonal settings, or that change of another that limits his/her control or freedom of movement can be accomplished without setting up resistance to the loss of freedom itself (see Brehm & Brehm, 1981).

The third law of interaction speaks directly to the notion of coactive, reciprocal control through interaction. The third law states, "control of others is gained through yielding control to them" (Strong & Claiborn, 1982, p. 39). By this they do not mean mere yielding or reflecting back another's predispositions, but using the other's natural inclination to control one's impression and behavior in the service of controlling them. While this law of interaction may at first seem overly facile or glib, it captures a fundamental tenet of interpersonal control. This law explains both the effortless quality of the mutual control established in congruent relationships and why unilateral (one-way) or coercive attempts at control in incongruent relationships are doomed to failure.

Given that interaction serves the purpose of control, communicative sequences are both efforts to control the other and feedback to the other on the success of his/her control attempts. Direct attempts to influence the other in ways they do not prefer will be resisted for obvious reasons. However, persons will adapt their control strategies to the contingencies of their environment (that is, the feedback they get from us, including clues as to our potential assets and vulnerabilities). Therefore, we assert control unobtrusively and noncoercively by managing our impressions through feedback, and control the other by controlling the course of their own influence

attempts. As Strong and Claiborn (1982) put it:

> Each participant in an interaction seeks to control the relationship to attain his or her desired definition. The desire to control relationships makes persons vulnerable to opportunities to take control. Thus, another's behavior can be channeled by making such opportunities available. . . . Because behavior is in the service of control, the other can be induced to change in particular ways by creating an opportunity for more advantageous control through behaving thusly and by yielding control to the other as the other responds to the opportunity by changing (p. 39).

the other is learning successful ways of controlling us by the feedback they receive, i.e., the success or failure of their behavior to induce the desired change. By harnessing this proclivity, we, in turn, are unobtrusively changing their behavior.

Of course, this scenario assumes that the other perceives him/herself to be vulnerable to the resource we are perceived to have, and our persuasive power is limited to the extent that the change required is not so great that the other is motivated to terminate the relationship and seek similar resources elsewhere. The observations about social power made by Thibaut and Kelley (1959) are informative in this respect. Managing impressions regarding a) the value attractiveness and availability of our resources, b) the extent and direction of our vulnerabilities to the other's resources, and c) the opportunities for acquiring alternate sources of satisfaction all relate to our ability to set our situational parameters for control. That is, without the other's perception of need, no control is possible, and the relative efficacy of satisfying the need by adapting themselves to the requirements of influencing the other sets an upper limit on the sort of required changes that will be tolerated.

Impression management is not only important as a component of control attempts, but has also been shown to be a powerful incentive for change in its own right (see Giles & Street, 1985, p. 235-239). These authors suggest that we have a powerful and pervasive need for social influence, and seek to manage our ongoing impression in ways that facilitate this goal. We are therefore motivated to change if we perceive that doing so enhances our opportunities for social power through management of the other's ongoing impression of us.

We can now see the relationship between coactive control and interpersonal influence or compliance gaining. Given that 1) we seek to control the other in social interaction, 2) attributions of control are a function of belief, and 3) the social self presentation of the actors involved sets up evidence for what might be advantageous control strategies, we can see how manipulating the control relevant cues in scenarios can either set up resistance or pave the way for unobtrusive compliance. Strategic empowering of the other serves as an attractive motivation for change, while conspicuous empowering of the self promotes resistance.

Taking the examples of Titanic Thompson and the three card monte dealer given earlier, both secured compliance by 1) providing incentives for controlling the situation (money, pride, revenge), 2) strategically manipulating the impression made of their areas of strength and vulnerability, and 3) strategically pointing out those behaviors that would allow the other to (apparently) control the situation to advantage. By giving the other specific avenues for control and the incentive to exert control, the other is induced to comply while thinking that he/she is securing compliance. The "low ball" technique (see Cialdini, 1985) operates along similar lines.

These factors underlie less deceptive or self serving influence situations as well. For example, a good sports coach instinctively sets up a relationship where each athlete derives help, praise, or other appropriate and desirable

rewards by successfully executing the proper performance. The athlete controls the coach's impression by his/her performance; the coach controls the performance by managing his/her impression. If a relationship is established such that the athlete elicits rewards only through "giving one hundred percent," then this coactive control serves their mutual benefit. By yielding control to some of their behavior, they elicit control of relevant aspects of the other's behavior. However, if the athlete is allowed to secure desired rewards through other means such as appealing to the coach's vanity, his control of the athlete as a coach is undermined and a different pattern of relational control is established (see Strong & Claiborn, p. 42).

A telling example of the coactive nature of control in the classroom involves the apocryphal story of the teacher who lectured from the far corner of his classroom because his students had deliberately reinforced successive approximations of this behavior throughout the term. That this sort of "runaway competence" on the part of these students is possible is testimony to the reciprocal nature of interpersonal influence.

## The Perplexities of Power

The idea that interpersonal control is coactive and dependent on the congruence of perceptions rather than on causal certainty also help us understand failed attempts at interpersonal influence and interpersonal "games without end." An important insight here is that control is simultaneous and ongoing, having little to do with overt dominance.

One general class of pathology involves the person's often unobtrusive attempts to unilaterally impose some preferred self conception and definition of the relationship. If these impositions are either minor or acceptable to the other then little is at stake. However, if the person is willing to enforce

such incongruent perceptions, then behavior patterns are set in motion that create a comedy of manners at best and quite often open conflict.

When persons are confronted with incongruent influence attempts then the other can either reject these definitions and begin a struggle over the definition of the relationship or being to learn to "play the game of not playing the game" and simultaneously validate and disbelieve these self definitions. In Bateson's words, "You pretend so and so and the [other] pretends to believe you" (Brand, 1974, p. 12).

This "you should feel this way toward me" paradoxical injunction can take many forms but follows the general principle of the "be spontaneous" paradox identified by Watzlawick et al. (1974). The more acceptance of the proposal is strived for, the more hostility is generated. Since the student is other is asked to do the impossible and produce spontaneous evidence of interest, enthusiasm, behavior change, and the like, he/she is similarly caught in a paradoxical bind.

This sort of resilient self fulfilling prophecy often comes about from the mispunctuation of cause and effect, wherein each party blames the other for causing or controlling the problem (see Watzlawick et al., 1967). In this sort of pathology each party sees the other as being the cause of or having potential control of the situation. Therefore, when the other does not use this control to rectify the situation, attributions of bad faith or craziness become common. This sort of erroneous causal attribution is also resilient to change since each party's ongoing behavior only makes more "real" their misattribution, and this situation may persist until some naturally occurring or serendipitous event makes the misattribution impossible. The operation of these "paradoxes of power" to the detriment of a teacher's perceived power in the classroom setting has been discussed in Brenders (1987). That such

"influence by declamation" leads to resistance rather than change should now be well grounded in the principles above.

As may now be apparent, the relational approach to interpersonal influence, as grounded in the works of the Palo Alto Group and elaborated in the writing of Strong and Claiborn (1982), holds great promise for research and teaching related to interpersonal influence. This approach is not only congruent with the most influential approach to communication theory, but accommodates up and coming advances in the social psychological zeitgeist such as the theory of impression management (see Giles & Street, 1985, p. 234). This approach encourages an other-directed, strategic approach to influence, generalizes well to real world influence in a variety of settings, and does not presuppose overly rational selections from hypothetical lists of tactics as do those approaches espousing the "strategic choice model" as critiqued in Seibold, Cantrill, and Meyers (1985). For these and other reasons, it should be a fruitful approach to the analysis of interpersonal influence.

## References


Bateson, G. (1972). Steps to an Ecology of Mind. New York: Ballantine Books.

Bateson, G. (1979). Mind and Nature: A Necessary Unity. New York: E.P. Dutton.

Brand, S. (1974). II Cybernetic Frontiers. New York: Random House.

Brehm, S. & Brehm, J. (1981). Psychological reactance: A theory of freedom and control. New York: Academic Press.

Brender, D. A. (1987). Some perplexities of power in the classroom: A pragmatic perspective on instructional relationships. Journal of Thought, 22, 51-56.

Cialdini, R. B. (1985). Influence: Science and practice. Glenview, Illinois: Scott, Foresman & Co.

Fisher, B. A. & Hawes, L. C. (1971). An interact system model: Generating a grounded theory of small groups. Quarterly Journal of Speech, 57, 444-453.

Frank, J.D. (1974). Persuasion and Healing: A Comparative Study of Psychotherapy. New York: Schocken Books.

Giles, H. & Street, R. L. (1985). Communicator characteristics and behavior. In M. L. Knapp & G. R. Miller (Eds.) Handbook of interpersonal communication (pp. 205-262). Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.

Haley, J. (1963). Strategies of Psychotherapy. New York: Grune & Stratton.

Kearney, P. (1987). Power in the classroom. Journal of Thought, 22, 45-50.

Leary, T. (1957). Interpersonal diagnosis of personality New York: Ronald

McCroskey, J.C. & Richmond, V.P. (1983). Power in the classroom I: Teacher and student perceptions. Communication Education,32, 175-184.

Millar, F.E. & Rogers, L.E. (1976). A relationship approach to interpersonal communication. In G. Miller (Ed.). Explorations in Interpersonal Communication. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications.

Nash, J. R. (1976). Hustlers and con men. New York: M. Evans & Co.

Norton, R. W. (1984). Power in the classroom 69: Communication techniques as alternatives to bondage. (critique of Kearney, Plax, Richmond, & McCroskey, 1984) International Communication Association Convention, San Francisco, CA.

Plax, T. G., Kearney, P., & Tucker, L. K. (1986). Prospective teachers' use of behavior alteration techniques on common student misbehaviors. Communication Education, 35, 32-42.

Renshon, S. A. (1979). The need for personal control in political life: Origins, dynamics, and implications. In L. Perlmuter & R. Monty (Eds.), Choice and perceived control (pp. 41-63). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

Ruesch, J. & Bateson, G. (1968). Communication: The Social Matrix of Psychiatry. New York: W.W. Norton & Co.

Seibold, D. R., Cantrill, J. G., & Meyers, R. A. (1985). Communication and interpersonal influence. In M. L. Knapp & G. R. Miller (Eds.) Handbook of interpersonal communication (pp. 551-611). Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.

Strong, S.R. & Claiborn, C.D. (1982). Change Through Interaction. New York: John Wiley & Sons.

Watzlawick, P. (1976). How Real is Real? New York: Random House.

Watzlawick, P. (1983). The Situation is Hopeless but not Serious: The Pursuit of Unhappiness. New York: W.W. Norton & Co.

Watzlawick, P. (1984). Self-fulfilling prophecies. In P. Watzlawick (Ed.). The Invented Reality. New York: W.W. Norton & Co.

Watzlawick, P., Beavin, J.H. & Jackson, D.D. (1967). The Pragmatics of Communication. New York: W.W. Norton & Co.

Watzlawick, P., Weakland, J. & Fisch, R. (1974). Change: Principles of Problem Formation and Problem Resolution. New York: W.W. Norton & Co.

Watzlawick, P. & Weakland, J.H. (1977) (Eds.). The Interactional View: Studies at the Mental Research Institute Palo Alto, 1965-1974. New York: W.W. Norton & Co.

Weakland, J.H., Fisch, R., Watzlawick, P., & Bodin, A.M. (1974). Brief Therapy: focused problem resolution. Family Process 13, 141-68.